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Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: 
Recent Changes in Understanding 
Obligations 
by 
Mr. Scott A. McConnaha 
The author is a communication specialist at the national headquarters of 
the Catholic Health Association of the United States, in St. Louis, and is 
pursuing a master's degree in moral theology at Saint Louis University. He 
is formerly a reporter for the Catholic Herald, the newspaper of the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee. 
The current case involving Terri Schiavo, a Florida woman whom 
doctors have determined has been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) 
since 1990, has sparked renewed interest in the ethical issues surrounding the 
use of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH). The Schiavo situation not 
only reveals the difficulty involved in choosing whether to discontinue a 
patient's ANH, but also the bitter divisiveness that sometimes accompanies 
the controversy over the moral justifiability of withdrawing ANH. 
214 
"By the rules of war and the Geneva Convention such actions -
death by starvation - would be harshly condemned and punishable 
in an international court ," said Judie Brown, president of the 
American Life League, a pro-life organization that purports 
alignment with the magisterium of the Catholic Church .! 
Mary Ann Kreitzer, president of the Catholic Media Coalition, 
said ''The euthanasia murder of Terri Schindler Schiavo by starvation 
and dehydration ... is a violation of her right to life and a crime 
against humanity."2 
"We 're delighted that the president [George W. Bush] supported 
his brother's [Florida Governor Jeb Bush] position that Terri Schiavo 
should not be starved," said Burke Balch, director of the Robert 
Powell Center for Medical Ethics, an affiliation of the National Right 
to Life Committee.3 
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These are impassioned words issued by seemingly powerful 
organizations. Such remarks may lead some to think that a decision to 
remove ANH from a loved one's care is immoral and contrary to Catholic 
Church teaching. Is it? 
The purpose of this di scuss ion is not to propose a solution to the 
Schiavo case, rather, it is to address one aspect of the current controversy 
that has sparked renewed interest: the Church 's stance on the use and 
removal of ANH. Health care providers at Catholic institutions, patients, 
family members, and others charged with their care, look to Church 
teaching for guidance on medical moral matters. Prolonging life through 
ANH is one topic that has certainly been addressed by the magi sterium and 
other Church bodies. But is there continuity between the Church's recent 
statements and the moral tradition? 
To begin this discussion, I will present the current Catholic Church 
position on the moral justifiability of withholding ANH from such patients 
as those in a PYS . Thi s will be followed by some arguments made by 
contemporary moral theologians who question these more recent Church 
teachings. Following that, I will lay out the historical developments of this 
ethical issue, the origins of which contemporary theologians cite when 
making their case. 
The Last 20 Years 
When a situation calling for the consideration of the removal of ANH 
- commonly known as tube feeding - presents itself, patients who are 
able to participate in the decision-making process, or the loved ones 
responsible for making the decision by proxy, are seldom in a situation 
where the answer is uncontestedly "no, you should not remove the feeding," 
or "yes, you should remove the feeding." The difficulty of making this 
decision is by no means alleviated by Church pronouncements over the past 
two decades. 
For guidance on moral medical issues, Catholic health care 
institutions in the United States rely on a collection of directives 
promulgated by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 
called the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services (ERDs). In the most recent edition of the ERDs, the USCCB 
acknowledges the need for further reflection on "the morality of 
withdrawing medically assisted hydration and nutrition from a person who 
is in the condition that is recognized by physicians as the ' persistent 
vegetative state ' (PYS)."4 This same acknowledgement of the U.S. bishops 
appeared in their earlier publication of Nutrition and Hydration: Moral 
and Pastoral Reflections.s 
Despite the call for further reflection , the U.S . bi shops do offer a 
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certain level of guidance here. "There should be a presumption in favor of 
providing nutrition and hydration to all patients, including patients who 
require medically assisted nutrition and hydration , as long as thi s is of 
sufficient benefit to outweigh the burdens involved to the patient."6 Some 
maintain that this directive " reflects a way of reasoning known as 
tutiorism. Tutiori sm holds that, in cases of doubt , one acts responsibly 
when the safer course is followed ."7 
"Tutiorism should not degenerate into rigori sm," however,s and there 
are signs that recent Church teaching on ANH for PVS patients has done just 
that. In 198 1, The Pontifical Council on Health Affairs said "There remains 
the strict obligation to apply under all circumstances those therapeutic 
measures which are called ' minimal ' : that is , those which are normally and 
customarily used for the maintenance of life (alimentation, blood 
transfusion s, injections, etc.) . To interrupt these minimal measures would, 
in practice, be equivalent to wishing to put an end to the patient 's life."9 
Four years later, the Pontifical Academy of Sciences reiterated this 
understanding more explicitly : " If the patient is in a permanent coma, 
irreversible as far as it is possible to predict, treatment is not required, but 
all care should be lavished on him including feeding .. .. If treatment is of 
no benefit to the patient, it may be withdrawn, while continuing with the 
care of the patient."lo 
Distinguishing between treatment and care has become an important 
point in debates on the use of ANH for PVS patients because of Church 
statements that permit the rernoval of interventions deemed burdensome. 
In 1992, for instance, the U.S. bi shops said "Such measures must not be 
withdrawn in order to cause death, but they may be withdrawn if they offer 
no reasonable hope of sustaining life or pose excessive ri sks or burdens." II 
With the Vatican clearly on their side, bishops ofthe New Jersey State 
Catholic Conference said in 1987, " that nutrition and hydration , being 
basic to human life, are aspects of normal care, which are not excessively 
burdensome, and should always be provided to a patient." 12 Writing on 
behalf of Nancy Jobes, a severely brain damaged woman whose husband 
sought to remove her ANH, the New Jersey bi shops said nutrition and 
hydration are not a form of medical treatment. Medical treatment is for 
curing di sease. Nutrition and hydration are for sustaining life. "For that 
fundamental reason we insist that nutrition and hydration must always be 
maintained."13 
The Catholic bishops of Pennsy lvania express a simil ar viewpoint as 
that of the New Jersey bishops: 
2 16 
The feeding - regardless of whether it be considered as treatment or 
as care - is serving a li fe-sustaining purpose. Therefore, it remains 
an ordinary means of sustai ning li fe and should be continued. In 
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other words, the mere di stinction between treatment and care does 
not of itself resolve the moral problem. Rather. its resolution still 
remains within the scope of the usual norms of ordinary and 
ex traord inary means. Whether it is viewed as treatment or care. it 
would be morall y wrong to discontinue nutriti on and hydrati on when 
they are within the realm of ordinary means. l~ 
Classifying ANH as treatment or care therefore becomes 
unnecessary, according to the bishops of Pennsylvania. All that matters is 
that ANH is an ordinClf), means of sustaining life, and therefore should not 
be removed. The Pennsylvania bi shops define ordinary means as "those 
which are available and do not require effort , suffering or expense beyond 
that which most people would consider appropriate in a serious 
situation ."" While the U.S. bi shops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities did 
say ANH has not been defi nitive ly deemed "normal [ordinary] care" by the 
magisterium, and that the issue surrounding the obligation of providing 
AN H is unresolved, it contends "that while legitimate Catholic moral 
debate continues , deci sions about these patients should be guided by a 
presumption in favor of medicall y ass isted nutrition and hydration ." 16 
In 1998, Pope John Paul II made a statement that supports the pro-life 
committee's position cited above. 
As ecumenical witness in defense of life develops, a great teaching 
effort is needed to clari fy the substantive moral difference between 
discontinuing medical procedures that may be burdensome, 
dangerous or disproportionate to the expected outcome - what the 
Catec hi sm of the Catholic Church call s " the refusal of 'overzealous' 
treatment" (No. 2278 ; cf. Evangelium Vitae 65) - and taking away 
the ordinary means of preserving life such as feed ing, hydration and 
normal medical care. The statement of the U.S. bishops ' pro-li fe 
committee, " Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral 
Considerat ions," rightly e mphasizes that the omission of nutriti on 
and hydra ti on intended to cause a patient 's death must be rejected 
and that. while givi ng careful consideration to a ll fac tors involved. 
the presLimption should be in favor of providing medicall y assisted 
nutrition and hydration to a ll pati ents who need them. To blur thi s 
di stinction is to introduce a source of countless injustices and much 
add itional angui sh. 17 
On March 20, 2004, following an international conference sponsored 
by the Pontifical Academy for Life and the World Federation of Catholic 
Medical Associations (FIAMC), the pope made hi s stance even clearer. He 
emphasized that nutrition and hydration, regardless of how they are 
admini stered, are "a natural means of preserving life, not a medical 
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procedure. Therefore, their use must be considered ordinary and 
appropriate and as such, morally obligatory."18 
John Paul II very explicitly places ANH directly in the category of 
ordinary care, the administration of which is to be presumed. This 
essentially brings to fruition a trend in Church positioning that has been 
growing since the early 1980s. Contemporary theologians, however, are 
not so sure this is consistent with the moral tradition. 
Contemporary Theologians 
A 1986 document of the U.S. Catholic bi shops sums up the current 
Church understanding of the administration of nutrition and hydration for 
all patients: 
Because human life has inherent value and dignity regardless of its 
condition, every patient should be provided with measures which can 
effectively preserve life without involving too grave a burden. Since 
food and water are necessities of life for all human beings and can 
generally be provided without the risks and burdens of more 
aggressive means for sustai ning life, the law should establi sh a strong 
presumption in favor of their use.19 
Though "food and water" generally refers to naturally administered 
food and drink, the statement above has been used to classify ANH in two 
distinctly important ways: 1) it is an ordinary means of sustaining life that 
2) causes benefit (namely the prolongation of biological life) rather than 
burden. Current arguments over these two points are what fuel much of the 
furor surrounding cases like that of Ms. Schiavo. If ANH is understood as 
an ordinary means of sustaining life and it offers sufficient benefit over 
potential burdens, then, according to the tradition, its use would be morally 
obligatory. 
Kevin O 'Rourke, OP, refutes this notion that ANH is an ordinary 
means that offers benefit to PVS patients. "The medical community has 
decided without equivocation that ANH is a medical therapy and may 
therefore be withdrawn from PVS patients because it is not beneficial."20 
He goes on to explain that arguing against the removal of ANH because it 
causes suffering and starvation is groundless: "PVS patients have no 
sensory capacity, they feel no pain as a result of withdrawal of ANH. 
Moreover, though death is foreseen, it need not be the direct intention of 
withdrawal. Rather, the direct intention of withdrawing ANH is simply to 
discontinue futile therapy."21 This last point is crucial because all involved 
agree that any action done specifically to cause death is considered 
euthanasia, and that is clearly illicit. 
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The contention that removing ANH does not cause a patient 's death is 
supported by Lisa Sowle Cahill. "To omit to provide extraordinary life 
support to a patient is not to directly cause his death, but to permit it to 
occur as a result of di sease."l1 She continues by explaining that the decision 
to remove life support is not done to kill the patient, but because in the 
cun'ent, unchanging state, the patient no longer possesses "the sufficient 
conditions for the fruitful development of loving relationships, both with 
other humans, and through them, with God."23 
In other words, when ANH offers no hope of benefit, or has been 
deemed burdensome to the PYS patient or those closest to him, its removal 
is licit because continuing to provide nutrition and hydration "would 
impede the [patient 's] response of love to God."2-l Individual s are "able to 
love God in the context of human life through loving others as 
[themselves]. Yet human life is not itself an absolute good. The good of life 
is a limited good precisely because it is the basis for pursuing the higher, 
more important spiritual goods of life (love of God and love of neighbor). 25 
Reacting to the Pennsylvania bi shops ' statement, Richard 
McCormick said traditional Catholic moral teachjng "maintains that life is 
a basic good but not an absolute one and that, therefore, not all means must 
be used to preserve it. .. Artificial nutrition-hydration that 'si mply puts off 
death by maintaining physical existence with no hope of recovery ... is 
useless and therefore not ethically obligatory."'26 Essentially, he is saying 
that life on earth is not to be regarded as an ultimate end, and to speak in 
such terms denies the fact that sometimes patients should be allowed to die. 
McCormick is arguing from the same standpoint as O' Rourke, Cahill , 
and numerous other contemporary moral theologians.27 ANH for the 
accurately diagnosed PYS patient does not fall within the realm of ordinary 
means that offers benefi t, its removal is not the cause of death, and its 
continuation is an unfortunate impediment to the patient's greater 
fulfillment. These are not new ideas. Moral theologians today, when 
reacting to recent Church statements on ANH and the care of PYS patients, 
appeal to a well-established theological tradition that goes back nearly 800 
years. 
Development of the Tradition 
When Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), the "Angelic Doctor," says that 
a person is "bound to nouri sh his body ... and to all the other items without 
which the body can not live,"28 it might be inferred that he believes "we 
have an absolutely binding obligation to take every step necessary for the 
preservation of one's life."29 A qualification of sorts appears, however, in 
his Summa where he addresses the question of whether one's fearlessness 
can be considered a sin. 
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It is inbred for a man to love his own life and those things which 
contribute to it, but in due measure ; that is, to love things of thi s kind 
not as though his goal were set in them, but inasmuch as they are to 
be used for his final end . .. So it is possible for someone to fear death 
and other temporal evils less than he should . .. Temporal goods ought 
to be despised in so far as they hinder us from love and fear of God ... 
But temporal goods are not to be despised in so far as they are helpful 
means of attaining things which promote fear and love of God.30 
Simply put, individuals are obliged to take care of themselves, but 
must be wary of letting the objects of this care, and even their lives on 
earth, become the primary goal of existence. (By no means, however, is he 
degrading life or calling for a happy pursuit of death.) Ultimately, each is to 
use his life for the pursuit of God. This is about as far as one can apply 
Aquinas to the topic at hand, but it is quite important nonetheless. In the 
above quote from question 126 of the "Secunda Secundre," he opens the 
door for future theologians to explore the notions of ordinary/extraordinary 
means, burden/benefit, and love of God as the fulfillment of life. 
One theologian from the sixteenth century is held up by moralists as 
the father of nutrition and hydration discussions regarding obligations in 
the preservation of life. Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), a Spanish 
Dominican, makes first mention of the usefulness of food in his 
Relectiones Theologicce. It is here that he presents a qualification to 
Aquinas's proposition that to act against the natural inclination to preserve 
one's life is a mortal sin. "If this is so, then it would seem that a sick person 
who does not eat because of some disgust of food would be guilty of a sin 
equivalent to suicide."3l 
Chief among Vitoria's points on this matter is that "a sick person is 
required to take food if there exists some hope of life."32 Exceptions are 
made for the patient who simply cannot bring himself to eat or drink. "If 
the patient is so depressed or has lost his appetite so that it is only with the 
greatest effort that he can eat food, thi s right away ought to be reckoned as 
creating a kind of impossibility and the patient is excused, at least from 
mortal sin, especially if there is little or no hope of life."33 
He is not condoning self-inflicted starvation as a means of suicide, 
nor is he allowing "much leeway if the means (food) are effective (a certain 
"hope of life") and do not involve a grave burden ... Clearly, Vitoria 
recognizes psychic as well as physiological illness, and his notion of grave 
burden involves more than physical pain ."34 
For Vitoria, food and drink are natural means for preserving life. 
Drugs, on the other hand, are unnatural. His distinction between the two 
means is somewhat ambivalent, though. Food is more obligatory because it 
is simply a natural necessi ty for life; drugs are less obligatory simply 
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because they are never always necessary or natural. "But on the other hand, 
medicine is also intended by nature for health. It would seem, then, that 
medicine is also natural."35 
Theologian Daniel Cronin, STD, Archbishop Emeritus of Hartford, 
CT, raises an important point that helps clarify Vitoria 's apparent 
indecisiveness about the natural and unnatural nature of drugs: "Drugs and 
medicines are not the basic way by which man is to nourish hi s life ... If 
man were never to be sick, he would never need medicines. If he is sick, 
however, it is quite natural for him to make use of artificial means of 
conserving life."36 This is the first inkli ng of the ordinary/extraordinary 
means di stinction to appear more substantively in the years to come. 
So for Vitoria, food and drink are a natural , necessary means of 
preserving life, but, like drugs, are not obligatory when their administration 
causes grave burden and offers no hope of benefit for the patient. Simply 
put, there can be circumstances, regarding the use of nutrition and 
hydration, where one is not morally obligated to preserve life. It is 
impOJ1ant to note that Vitoria lived at a time when the only way nutrition 
and hydration could be administered was through the mouth . If he allowed 
for circumstances when food and drink could licitly be declined, how 
much more so for tube feeding? 
In the century following Vitoria, numerous theologians continued to 
address the issue of obligations in preserving life. The terms ordinary and 
extraordinary are in fact first applied to this di scussion in 1595 by 
Dominican theologian Domingo Banez (1528-1604). At a time when 
anesthesia was so plimitive that it gave little relief from the pain of surgery, 
"Banez points out that people are called to conserve their lives but not by 
extraordinary means involving great pain , anguish, or undertakings 
disproportionate to their state."37 
Jesuit Juan Cardinal de Lugo (l 583-1660) takes Vitoria 's ideas and 
develops them with different examples that are employed even today. One 
of his more noteworthy illustrations, which conveys the lack of obligation 
to use ordinary means that offer no hope of benefit, places a man squarely 
in the face of certain death by fire. 
The man notices that he has water to extinguish part of the ftre , but 
not all of it, and that he can only delay his death by the water's use. Is the 
man under an obligation to use the water? De Lugo answers in the 
negative, "because the obligation of conserving life by ordinary means is 
not an obligation of using means for such a brief conservation."38 
This does not mean, however, that if there were a possibility of 
extinguishing the entire fire that it should not be attempted. On the 
contrary, the man would be obliged to try. "The use of water would be 
analogous to eating ordinary foods ... Thus, de Lugo wished to admit the 
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possibility that an ordinary means need not be obligatory because the 
benefit to the person is too slight to carry moral weight."39 
According to de Lugo, any means used to conserve life "must give 
definite hope of being proportionately useful and beneficial before it can be 
called obligatory. It is noteworthy also that de Lugo applies this doctrine even 
to the taking of food which is a purely natural means of conserving life."40 
Alphonsus Liguori (1696-1787), though deemed an authority on this 
matter, adds little that is new to the tradition taking shape at the hands of 
his predecessors. His review and confirmation of what they posited is still 
important nonetheless. 41 He restates what were already widely accepted 
norms for assessing the duty to preserve life: 
I. There is no obligation to employ expensive or "uncommon 
medicines" 
2. Moving to a more healthful climate is not obligatory 
3. Extraordinary means, such as amputation of an extremity, are not 
required 
4. There is an obligation to employ ordinary interventions if the hope 
of benefit exists42 
Regarding the popular example of amputation as an extraordinary 
means, it must be remembered that such a surgery, at a time of primitive 
anesthesia, would have been considered so extreme that a patient was 
almost always justified in forgoing the painful ordeal, even if it was 
determined that there was a possibility of benefit. Developments in health 
care have all but rendered that example useless. 
Following Liguori, and throughout the nineteenth century, the writings of 
moral theologians on issues related to ordinary/extraordinary means of 
conserving life had become relatively unified around the four points listed 
above.43 During this time, and into the twentieth century, numerous 
theologians supported the idea that there are "some non-obligatory means 
that remain optional regardless of the condition of the patient."44 
Hieronymus Noldin (1838-1922), for instance, says that moving to a 
more healthful climate or enlisting the services of the best physicians is not 
obligatory, even for a person who could easily afford it. All that is required 
of anyone is the use of those means that are ordinarily employed.45 This 
same idea is found in the manual of Heribert Jone, OFM Cap. (1924-
1999).46 Henry Davis, SJ, concurs as well. He says that although an 
individual is required to employ ordinary means to preserve his life, he is 
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not required to use "extraordinary expensive methods, nor methods that 
would inflict on him almost intolerable pain or shame."47 
In 1950, theologian Gerald Kelly, SJ, (1902-1964), published "The 
Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preserving Life." Eighteen months later, 
he followed up with "The Duty to Preserve Life." These two articles 
together present a summation of the theological tradition regarding 
ordinary/extraordinary means and applies that tradition to the "modern" 
medical situation. In line with his predecessors, Kelly relies on hope of 
benefit when it comes to assessing the obligation to preserve life. 
Theologians have responded favorably to the suggestion that even an 
ordinary artificial means need not be considered obligatory for a 
patient when it is relatively useless ... [T]o avoid complications, it 
would be well to include the notion of usefulness in the definitions of 
ordinary and extraordinary means.48 
He defines ordinary and extraordinary means as follows: "Ordinary 
means are all medicines, treatments, and operations, which offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without 
excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience." Extraordinary means are 
those interventions that are excessively expensive, painful, or inconvenient, 
and "would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit."49 
For Kelly, all patients are entitled to such things as nursing care, pain 
relief, food and drink, and "the opportunity of preparing for death." There 
is no moral obligation, however, to use "artificiallife-sustainers .. . unless 
they offer the hope of some real benefit... without imposing a 
disproportionate inconvenience."5o 
Seven years later, Kelly revisited the issue in another article, 
"Preserving Life," where he expanded some of his previous observations. 
Like those before him, Kelly says that every person has a duty to conserve 
his life through ordinary means. To do otherwise, would be suicide. For 
ordinary means to be refused a patient, is equal to euthanasia. However, "It 
is not always easy to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary 
means of preserving life."51 
Moral theologians before Kelly knew of the difficulty in trying to 
distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary means. They knew that 
when making moral decisions about preserving life, avoiding evil and 
doing good were their guiding principles. "[BJut there are reasonable and 
proportionate limits to one's duty of doing good."52 
The morali sts set out to make a prudent estimate of the limits of this 
duty. In other words, they wanted to answer the simple question that 
any good man might ask: "How much does God demand that I do in 
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order to preserve thi s life which belongs to God and of which I am 
only a steward?"5] 
As has been discussed previously, the moralists considered such 
inconveniences as expense and pain when measuring one's duty to do good 
when considering means for preserving life. Kelly reaffirms the idea that 
inconveniences thought to be excessive "by reason of expense, pain, or 
other hardship to oneself or others" are legitimately called extraordinary. 54 
Among the examples of such extraordinary means, Kelly lists "intravenous 
feeding to prolong life in a terminal coma."55 This appears to be a semantic 
development (not a change in thinking) from what he had said in a previous 
article. "Kelly wishes to consider such means ordinary, but useless, 
artificial means of preserving life and so optional."56 
Kelly 's question about how far one must go in trying to preserve life 
is addressed by Pope Pius XII. 
Normally one is held to use only ordinary means according to the 
circumstances of persons, places, times and cultures - that is to say, 
means that do not involve any grave burdens for oneself or another. A 
more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most people and 
would render the attainment of a higher, more important good too 
difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact subordinated 
to spiritual endsY 
This statement not only reveals Pius ' embrace of the moral tradition 
regarding ordinary/extraordinary means, but reflects his Christian 
understanding of mortality, and that there is higher achievement than life 
on earth. 
Cronin wrote in his 1958 doctoral dissertation (which later became a 
chapter in Conserving Human Life, published by the Pope John Center) 
that "The teaching that an ordinary means of conserving life must offer a 
hope of benefit is certainly in hannony with common sense. It would be 
unreasonable to bind an individual with a moral obligation of employing a 
remedy or cure which offers no hope of benefit. . . No one writes in 
opposition to this teaching."58 He even goes so far as to say that the 
ordinary intake of food (not to mention ANH) may be optional if no hope 
of benefit exists.59 
Like all the others, Cronin does highlight the moral responsibility to 
use ordinary means in preserv ing one's life. "Not to employ the ordinary 
means of conserving life is tantamount to suicide and thus a grave sin."60 
Thi s statement, especially when it follows the one above, has led to 
confusion. Cronin says that hope of benefit makes all the difference here. 
"We have included the notion of utility or proportionate hope of success 
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and benefit as an essential part of our definition of ordinary means. Any 
means, therefore, that does not give definite hope of benefit is an 
extraordinary means."61 
So food and drink, whether taken by mouth or administered through a 
gastrostomy tube, becomes an extraordinary means of conserving life 
when it offers no hope of benefi t; rendering it, therefore, optional, or not 
morally obligatory. This is the approach taken by Catholic Church 
hierarchy even as recently as 1995. 
An Apparent Shift 
The 1980 Vatican "Declaration on Euthanasia" reflects the centuries-
old tradition laid out above. 
[O]ne cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to a 
technique which is already in use but which canies a risk or is 
burdensome. Such a refusal is not the equivalent of sui cide; on the 
contrary, it should be considered as an acceptance of the human 
condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a medical procedure 
disproportionate to the results that can be expected, or a desire not to 
impose excess ive expense on the family or the community. When 
inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used, it is 
permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms of 
treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome 
prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person 
in similar cases is not interrupted.62 
Fifteen years later, Pope John Paul II presented Evangelium Vitae (On 
the Value and Inviolability of Human Life). Part of thi s encyclical deals 
with conserving life and takes its moral cue straight from the above-cited 
Declaration on Euthanasia: 
In such situations. when death is clearly imminent and inev itable, 
one can in conscience "refuse forms of treatment that would only 
secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as 
the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not 
interrupted." Certainly there is a moral obligation to care for oneself 
and to allow oneself to be cared for, but this duty must take account 
of concrete circumstances. It needs to be determined whether the 
means of treatment available are objectively proportionate to the 
prospects for improvement. To forego extraordinary or 
di sproportionate means is not the equi valent of suicide or euthanasia; 
it rather expresses acceptance of the human condition in the face of 
death.63 
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Compare this, however, to what he said only three years later: 
"[T]he omission of nutrition and hydration intended to cause a patient 's 
death must be rejected and that, while giving careful consideration to all 
factors involved, the presumption should be in favor of providing 
medically assisted nutrition and hydration to all patients who need them ."64 
Here, the pope is much more aligned with the Pontifical Council on Health 
Affairs ' statements that appeared in the 1981 publication of Questions of 
Ethics Regarding the Fatally III and the Dying, cited earlier. 
Further cementing the pope's stance is his statement issued last 
March. Even a bleak prognosis for recovery, "when the vegetative state 
lasts longer than a year, cannot ethically justify abandoning or interrupting 
basic care, including food and hydration, of a patient." Discontinuing a 
patient's nutrition and hydration "is truly euthanasia by omission."65 
This most recent statement is indicative of the Church 's seeming 
modification of the centuries-old moral tradition that demands the presence 
of a reasonable hope of benefit (historically understood as contributing to 
the healthful recovery of the patient) before obligating anyone to use 
interventions for the conservation of life. Suddenly it has become a matter 
of choosing between the use of ANH to keep a patient alive (with hope of 
benefit being reduced to the sustaining of biological life) or withholding 
ANH to cause death. The apparent shift in terminology reveals a shift 
toward physicalism-that everything supervenes on the physical. 
Responding to the Schiavo case, a recent statement of the 
Florida bishops claims to offer clarification on "the church 's teaching 
about when it is permissible to withhold or withdraw nutrition and 
hydration. They have made clear that there should be a presumption in 
favor of providing medically assisted nutrition and hydration as long as it is 
of sufficient benefit to outweigh the burdens involved to the patient."66 
While presuming in favor of ANH, however, the Florida bishops do 
acknowledge the sometimes licit refusal of treatment. They specifically 
cite a "burdensome prolongation of life" as reason enough to discontinue 
ANH, "and that this may be properly seen as an expression of our hope in 
the life to come."67 
In a single paragraph the Florida bishops appear to take both sides of 
the current debate surrounding the use of ANH. On one hand, there is a call 
for a presumption in favor of using ANH in all cases. This appears to be a 
popular line of thinking among many pro-life groups and Church officials. 
On the other hand, there is an appeal for avoiding anything that can 
become a burdensome prolongation of life. This is in line with the 
theological tradition. 
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